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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
.J. SEAL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 10171 
TA YCO, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATE:MENT OF F.NGTS 
This is a suit on an open account. The lower court en-
tered judgment for the plaintiff-appellant for a reduced 
amount because of an offset alllowed defendant respond-
ent on a jury verdict. Appellant seeks to have the judg-
ment altered to eliminate the offset amount. 
Plaintiff's assignor, the American Brake Shoe Com-
pany, sold certain merchandise to the defendant during 
1961 at' per the statement attached as Exhibit "A" to 
plaintifft' cmnplaint (R. 2). Defendant's liability to 
plaintiff for this mnount as prayed was not in dispute 
and it was stipulated at pretrial that plaintiff should have 
judgnwnt therefor except to the extent that defendant 
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was entitled to offsets claimed through its predecessor 
in interest, J. Verne Taylot, which would reduce or can-
cel out entirely plaintiff's claim depending on the total 
amount of any offsets (R. 5, paragraph No.1). 
At pretrial defendant asserted two offsets (R. 5, 6, 
paragraphs No. 2 and No. 3). At trial the first was 
abandoned (R. 55) and the case went to trial on the second 
only, which was an alleged loss of profits suffered by 
defendant's predecessor in interest from an alleged 
breach of contract in failing to deliver certain track 
shoes for heavy construction equipment which defend-
ant's predecessor ordered from plaintiff's assignor in 
January, 19·57. 
On January 25, 1957, the American Brake Shoes in 
response to Mr. Taylor's request submitted to him a quo-
tation of prices which provided, inter alia: 
"FOR HD·-20 .A:C TR.A:CTOR 
240 pes. AMSCO Manganese Steel Track $34.6-5 jlOO# 
Shoe 24" Wide, with straight, for resale 
high, grouser *266466, Dwg. CB- less 20% 
30204 Wt. 62~# each. 
240 pes. AMSCO Manganese Steel Track $34.G5j100# 
Shoe 26" Wide, with straight, for resale 
high, grouser *308297, Dwg. CB- less 20% 
30594 Wt. 70# each. 
We do not own any patterns for 
the HD-20 A.C. T·ractor in the 
non-skid (corrugated or wave) 
type, but could make them if this 
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type is required but then the price 
would be $44.00 jlOO# less 20% for 
resale." ( E.XHIBIT 2) 
It also had the date "April15" typed in on the blank pro-
vided in the following printed statement: 
"SHIPMENT ·····--------------- after receipt of formal 
order or necessary pattern equipment. Please in-
clude complete shipping instructions with your 
order, whenever possible." 
It expressly stated that it was subject to Conditions 
of Sale specified on the reverse side, which provided 
inter alia: 
"1. CONDITIONS 
(a) No terms and conditions contained in 
any order placed with seller, other than those 
herein and no agreement or other understanding 
in any way modifying the terms and conditions 
herein shall be binding on seller unless hereafter 
made in writing and signed by its authorized rep-
resentative. 
* * * 
"4. DELIVERY 
(a) Dates quoted herein are approximate 
and are based upon prompt receipt of all neces-
sary inforn1ation. 
(b) All sales are f.o.b. seller's plant, Chicago 
Heights, Illinois, unless otherwise specified. 
Claims for loss or damage in transit must be filed 
by buyer. Seller will, however, assist whenever 
possible, in all such claims. 
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(c) Seller shall not be liable for any delays 
or defaults, hereunder by reason of fire, floods, 
acts of God, labor troubles, inability to secure 
raw materials, acts of government or other causes 
beyond its reasonable control. In the event of any 
such delay, the date of delivery shall be extended 
for a period equal to the time lost by reason of 
the delay. In no event shall seller be liable for 
special or consequential damages. 
• * * 
"6. CANCELLATIONS 
Cancellations of orders may be made only by 
mutual consent." 
On January 30, 1957, a contractor in Idaho placed 
an order with Mr. Taylor for equipment of the type 
quoted by American Brake Shoe Company (EXHIBIT 
1). On January 31, 19·57, Mr. Taylor sent his purchase or-
der No. 7144 to the American Manganese Steel Division, 
a branch of the American Brake Shoe Company, for the 
purchase of 240 non skid off-set manganese shoes for 
HD-20 Allis-Chalmers Tractors (EXHIBIT 3). On Feb-
ruary 6, 1957, seller sent buyer the following letter which 
was a printed form except for the word in italics which 
were typewritten : 
"Gentlemen: 
Thank you kindly for your purchase order No. 
7144 which, in order to expedite delivery of the 
castings, has been split up for production at the 
following plants: 
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Item No. Article Castings being produced at 
The above order has been transferred to our Oak-
land plant for production. . 
"Within the course of the next few days, you will 
receive formal acknowledgment from each of the 
foundries 1nentioned above, and at the same time, 
will receive information concerning shipment of 
the material. 
Yours very truly, 
AMERICAN MANGANESE 
STEEL D·IVISION 
By W. E. Broscombe, Jr." 
(E.XHIBIT 7) 
On February 22, 1957, the Oakland Foundry of seller 
advised the buyer its order was ''now being filled in ac-
cordance with our standard Condition of Sale or Contract 
with you. Our Foundry order F·57 -165 has been assigned 
to it. Shipment is scheduled % April, 1957, % May, 
U)5 7." (EXHIBIT 8). On March 2, 1957, buyer wrote 
letter to seller's Oakland, California, foundry which 
stated, inter alia: 
"It is necessary to determine two items in this 
letter. First, the card received from Mr . .Spangen-
berg on Feb. 22 about the above order. This order 
was accepted by us for delivery not later than 
the 2nd week in April 19517 based on authority of 
~Ir. Dantiko and this delivery was by our custo-
nler specified as being very necessary. Hence, 
your card which specified lj2 of the order would 
shipped in April and % in May absolutely dis-
mayed us. 
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"Will you please advance your schedule to 
meet the promised quotation given us by Mr. Dan-
tiko by air maillj23j57, quotation No. 125-I-187, 
this was specified as sure of delivery by April15, 
1957. Order placed on this basis. 
* * * 
"Thank you for your fine cooperation in the 
past, and trusting that compliance with these letter 
requests will be graciously made." (EXHIBIT 5) 
On April 10, 1957, the Idaho contractor referred to 
above wired a cancellation or his order to Mr. Taylor 
(EXHIBIT 4) and Mr. Taylor immediately cancelled his 
order with the American Brake Shoe Company (R. 58). 
On May 4, 1957, Mr. Taylor wrote to seller's Oakland 
Foundry as follows: 
"American Manganese Steel Div. 
850 Ferry Street 
Oakland, California 
Mr. Ed. Welsh, Western Sales Mgr. 
Dear Ed: 
"This letter is to acquaint you with the situation 
at Palisades. We contacted the boys there and 
they say they are not in a position to take the 
26" shoes which they ordered and then cancelled, 
their #56-2150, our order #7144. 
"Because of our warehousing situation, we would 
not like to take any shoes to warehouse at the 
present, but when we are able to move some of 
the three sets we still have, the picture may 
change appreciably. 
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"Please therefore, in accordance with our previ-
ou~ telephone conversation cancel our order 
#7144 for Palisades Contractors. 
"'vV e shall go to work on sale of those shoes and 
some additional ones to make your work to the 
present profitable, both for ourselves and for 
you folks. You might, by return mail, advise 
how 1nuch of a change in the 26" pattern would 
be required to 1nake 24" shoes, for I had a very 
interesting conversation about 24" shoes the 
other day. 
"How soon might we expect the return of the 
20" and 22" shoes which you are preparing for us 
and advise if you have either of these patterns 
in your stock for we could use 8 more of the 20" 
shoes this pattern to complete our set. If you do 
not have this pattern I will order same from 
'Chicago Heights as soon as you advise me. THIS 
IS NOT AN ORDER FOR 8." 
Very truly yours, 
TAYLOR M. & S COMPANY 
J. Verne Taylor, Manager" 
(E,XIDBIT 9) 
Thereafter the buyer "considered I had cancelled it and 
I didn't do any n1ore about it." (R. 59). During the period 
following April10, 1957, the American Brake Shoe Com-
pany had a local resident agent, Mr. Charles Bauman, 
who lived in Salt Lake City until March of 1959, who 
saw "Jfr. Taylor at least once per month (R. 64, R. 67). 
Plaintiff nwved for a directed verdict at the close 
of thP trial of this cause on four grounds (R. 40). This 
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motion was denied and the jury returned a verdict al-
lowing defendant an offset of $2,590.00 (R. 27) which 
then resulted in a net verdict of $99·4.42 and judgment was 
entered on this net verdict plus interest thereon since 
December 14, 1961 (R. 28). Plaintiff moved for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict and if denied to correct 
a miscalculation of the offset amount and the Court 
denied both n1otions (R. 77). Plaintiff appeals from the 
judgment entered because of errors in these rulings of 
the trial court. 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE PROVIDED THAT UNDER 
NO CIR<CUMSTANCES SHOULD THE SELLER BE LIABLE 
FOR SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE1S AND THE 
DAMAGES ASSERTED BY BUYER IN THIS CASE WERE 
SPECIAL AND NOT GENERAL DAMAGES SO THE COURT 
ERRED IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO ASSEiS'S SPEeiAL 
DAMAGES AS AN OFFSET. 
As to the exculpatory provision of Paragraph 4( c) of 
the Conditions of Sale of Exhibit 2, the Trial Court held, 
after first instructing the jury to the contrary, that the 
elimination of liability for special damages would be 
restricted to those particular circumstances that would 
absolve seller from responsibility for any damages (R. 
74). It is appellant's contention, however, that the first 
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stmtt>net- of that paragraph refers to both special and 
g~neral drunages so no liability of any sort could be 
m;~t-rtt~d by the buyPr if any of those conditions existed 
(appellant never contended that they were applicable 
in thi~ case), whereas the seller would be liable for gen-
t·rnl but not for special damages if none of such condi-
tion~ were involved. Any other construction would give 
no meaning whatsoever to the last sentence and would 
therefore violate the rule of construction that all terms 
of a contract will be harmonized to give meaning to all 
of them if this can be done without violence to the inten-
tion of the parties. Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 236 
{a). It would be more certain if the provisions regarding 
special damages and general damages were in separate 
paragraphs but to make that consideration controlling 
would be to exalt form over substance and give undue 
wPight to a minor difference in form, especially when 
the words in question were words of art and should be 
given their technical meaning. Restatement of Contracts, 
Sec. 235 (b). 
In the case of Eastern Brass & Copper Company, 
lnc. l'. General Electric Supply Corporation, 101 F. Supp. 
410, the District Court for the Southern District of New 
I ork had a very similar question presented under an 
exculpatory provision nearly identical to the one at bar. 
In that case the exculpatory provisions were: 
'''Ye shall not be liable for delays resulting 
fron1 causes beyond our reasonable control or 
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caused by fire, labor difficulties, or delays in our 
usual sources of supply." 
And then further : 
"We shall not, under any circumstances, be 
liable for special or consequential damages on 
account of delay." 
In that case the court held that the words "special or 
consequential damages" as used in provisions of a con-
tract for sale of electrical equipment that seller should 
not under any circumstances be liable for"special or con-
sequential" damages on account of delay were used in con-
tradiction to "general or direct" damages. There the 
court denied the seller's motion for a summary judgment 
because some elements of plaintiff's complaint alleged 
damages which were general rather than special and held 
that general but not special damages could be recovered 
despite the provision quoted above. That case was also 
very similar in that the contract there, as here, eliminated 
any claim for damages under certain specified conditions 
of the type which were excluded in this seller's contract. 
It is to be noted that the court there was not concerned 
as to the cause of the delay since no mention was made 
as to the reasons for the delay, hence it read the latter 
provisions excluding special liability without reference 
to the earlier provision which excluded liability of any 
type. It is respectfully submitted that the trial court in 
this case sought to apply the rule of ejusdem generis to a 
situation where it is not applicable since the seller's lia-
bility for special damages is to be determined from the 
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laHt Ht•ntetwP of paragraph 4( c) of Exhibit 2 and not from 
the t'irt:it sentence of that paragraph. 
To the smne effect is the holding in the case of 
.:lRillCO Steel Corporation v. Ford Construction Com-
pany, Ark. 372 SW2 630, which held that a contract 
which provided that in no event should seller be liable for 
eonsequential damages did not include direct or fore-
t:iPt•able damages and that damages for breach of an im-
plied warranty of quality were direct and not consequen-
tial. 
In this case the buyer made no claim for general 
damages and its offset was clearly based on special dam-
ages only as appears in the Jury Instructions No. 3 (R. 
70, 71). To allow the jury to grant an offset based on 
special da1nages is to contravene the terms of the con-
tract in question and to rewrite the contract for the par-
ties which constitutes error. 
POINT II 
THE CONTRA:CT OF SALE BE'TWEEN AMERICAN 
BRAKE SHOE COMPANY 
AND J. VERNE TAYI.;OR PROVIDED THAT THE TRA:CK 
SHOES IN QUESTION SHOULD BE DELIVERED ONE-HALF 
IN APRIL, 1957, AND ONE-HALF IN MAY, 1957, SO THERE 
WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT WHEN THE BUYER 
CANCELLED HIS ORDER ON APRIL 10, 1957, AND IT WAS 
THEREFORE ERROR TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The buyer's order of January 31, 1957 (EXHIBIT 
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3) could not have constituted an acceptance of an· offer 
to sell by seller since the latter expressly made orders 
based on its price quotation subject to home office accept-
ance (EXHIBIT 2). Such a quotation as EXHIBIT 2 is 
not an offer under the rule of Sec. 25 of the R-estate-
ment of Contracts, which provides: 
"WHEN A MANIFESTATION OF INTEN-
~TION IS NOT AN OFFER 
If from a promise, or manifestation of inten-
tion, or from the circumstances existing at the 
time, the person to whom the promise or mani-
festation is addressed knows or has reason to 
know that the person making it does not intend it 
as an expression of his fixed purpose until he 
has given a future expression of assent, he has 
not made an offer." 
Also, an acceptance to be legally effective must be for 
the identical terms and conditions of the offer. In 17 
CJS, 674, Contracts, Sec. 42, it is stated: 
"'The rule, as stated in Corpus Juris, which 
has been quoted and cited with approval, is that 
the offeror has a right to prescribe in his offer 
any conditions as to time, place, quantity, mode of 
acceptance or other matters which it may please 
him to insert in and make a part thereof, and the 
acceptance, to conclude the agreement, must in 
every respect meet and correspond with the offer, 
neither falling short or, nor going beyond the 
terms proposed but exactly meeting them at all 
points and closing with them just as they stand 
and, in the absence of such an acceptance, subse-
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qurnt words or acts of the parties cannot create 
a contract." 
In R. J. DaunL Canst. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 747 
P~ 817, See. 73 of Williston on Contracts, Revised Edi-
tioll, wm; quoted in part as follows: 
". . . and if any provision is added to which 
the offeror did not assent, the consequence is not 
merely that this provision is not binding and that 
no contract is formed, but the offer is rejected." 
That case held that no contract was entered into when 
the acceptance did not include an extra price contained 
in the subcontractor's offer even though the extra price 
provision later became moot due to the terms of the 
princpal contract. In this case, however, Mr. Taylor spe-
cified shipment on April 1, 1957, whereas the quotation 
of January 25, 1957, was for shipment approximately on 
April 15, 1957. (The reference to two weeks after April 
1, 1957, refers not to the order in question but as to the 
buyer's transaction with his purchaser.) Thus no con-
tract was entered into until seller's conditional acceptance 
of buyer's order on February 6, 1957, which expressly 
provided that the shipment time would be specified by 
the foundry filling the order (EXHIBIT 7) and the latter 
specified one-half in April, 1957, and one-half in May, 
Hl51 (EXHIBIT 8). Buyer's letter of March 2, 1957, 
EXHIBIT 5) recognized the terms of acceptance by 
St'ller but requested an advance of its schedule to satisfy 
buyer's customer. Legally, therefore, the contract terms 
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were for delivery one-half in April, 1957, and one-half in 
May, 1957, or there was no contract. Thus no breach of 
contract could have occurred by April 10, 1957, when 
buyer cancelled his order (R. 58). Without a breach of 
contract, any offset to plaintiff's claim would be erron-
eous and should be reversed. The question as to whether 
seller's quotation of January 25, 1957, (EXHIBIT 2) was 
an offer or an invitation to make an offer, an issue raised 
by plaintiff in the pre-trial order (R. 6, paragraph No.4) 
would be a question of law for the trial court and not a 
question of fact for the jury. The court treated it as an 
offer and plaintiff subn1its this was erroneous. 
POIN'r III 
THE PARTIES 'TO THE 1957 CONTRACT OF SALE CAN-
CELLED IT BY MUTUAL CONSENT AFTER ANY CLAIM BY 
BUYER FOR DAMAGES AROSE SO AS A MATTER OF LAW 
'THE DE'FENDANT HAD NO VALID OFFSET ARISING 
FRiOM ANY BRE.NCH THEREOF BY XHE SELLER, AND 
IT WAS THERE1FORE ERRiOR FOR THE COURT TO DENY 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON 
THIS GROUND. 
Here it is undisputed that Mr. Taylor asked the 
A1nerican Brake Shoe Company to cancel the order on 
which respondent's offset was based and that the Ameri-
can Brake Shoe Company did so and never billed him 
for the 100 track shoes it made at his request. It is also 
undisputed that neither Mr. Taylor nor the respondent 
ever took any action to assert the claim upon which this 
offset was based until it was raised as defense to this 
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suit despite monthly contact with seller'~ representative 
for ovPr :t~ 1nonths (R. 64, 67). In fact, neither the re-
:-;pondent nor .Mr. Taylor even had the original quotation 
from the s~ller when this case was tried. (Appellant pro-
duet>d a eopy of it for trial pursuant to respondent's re-
quest, H. -!3, 44). It stretches one's credulity beyond the 
breaking point to imagine that even Mr. Taylor could 
believe he had a justifiable claim against American Brake 
Shoe Company in view of his own actions in 19'57 and com-
pi Ph' silence concerning it for over six years. There was 
no Pvidence from which the jury could find that the con-
tract of sale existed after May 4, 1957, so there was no 
qtwstion of fact concerning that point and the jury should 
have been directed accordingly. Even if there was no 
mutual rescission as a matter of law, it would be most 
unfair to allow a buyer to induce a seller to believe that 
a contract was rescinded and so allow the statute of limit-
ations to bar any claim it had under a contract and then 
to permit the buyer, as here, to assert rights under it in 
defense to a bill he incurred thereafter and failed to pay . 
. -\.11 the eletnents of, and reasons for the policy which give 
rise to, the doctrine of estoppel are here present and 
should be invoked to prevent respondent from denying 
a mutual rescission of the 1957 contract even if no mutual 
rescission in fact occurred. 
The statement in Hartwell v. Minneapolis-Moline 
Power Implement Company, 117 Colorado 291, 186 P. 2d 
:.?:.?S, that 
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"A party to a contract can not treat it as 
binding and rescind it at the same time." 
should apply equally under the facts of this case. 
POINT IV 
THE BUYER WAS UNDER A DUTY TO MITIGATE 
DAMAGES RE'SUUTING FROM ANY BREACH OF CON-
TRA1CT BY SELLER, AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
THAT THE BUYER .A:TT'EMPTED TO OBTAIN FOR HIS 
PURCHASER ·THE 'l''RAGK SHOES IN QUESTION BY APRIL 
15, 1957, WHEN IT BECAME EVIDENT ON FgBRUARY 22, 
1957, THAT DELIVERY OF PART OF THE ORDER WOULD 
NOT BE MADE UNTIL MAY, 1957, OR THAT IT WOULD BE 
IMPOSSIBLE TO AGQUIRE THEM FROM ANY OTHER 
SOURJCE BY THE REQUIRED DATE TO EF·FEGT THE RE-
SALE. 
An injured party to a contract should minimize or 
even eliminate the damages he suffers as a result of a 
breach of contract and no recovery is allowed for special 
damages if the buyer fails to obtain substitute goods in 
time to consummate a resale of them. Restatement of 
Contracts, Sec. 336. State of Delaware v. Massachusetts 
Bo11Ading & Insurance Company (Delaware) 49 F. Supp. 
467. The rule is stated in 46 Am. Juris. 812, Sales Sec. 
683 as follows : 
"The fact that a reasonable substitute may 
be obtained in the market materially affects the 
question of damages and 1nay even limit the re-
covery to the difference between the agreed price 
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and what the article or commodity reasonably 
answering the purpose would have cost." 
l.n this case the evidence is entirely devoid of any 
proof that l\lr. Taylor took any efforts to meet this duty 
or ever made any inquiries to ascertain whether it was 
impossible to obtain a substitute product when he became 
aware on February 22, 19·57, that the American Brake 
Shoe Company was not scheduling delivery in time to 
meet his customer's delivery date. The fact that the 
cancellation was made as late as April 10, 1957, for an 
imperative need to be filled April15, 19·57, demonstrates 
that the ultin1ate customer was able to meet his needs in 
a very short time from a competing product hence it was 
possible to mitigate any damages in this case. At least 
a court can not properly assume that this manufactureT 
was the only one who could make this product or make 
it within the required time or that Mr. T·aylor had ex-
l'reised reasonable diligence in ascertaining this but in-
adYPrtently failed to present proof of it. To allow special 
damages to stand under such circumstances is to elimi-
nate thP wise requirement and policy of the law to re-
quire damages to be lessened as much as is reasonably 
possible. 
POINr V 
TIME WAS NOT OF THE ESSENCE OF THIS CON-
TRACT AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE 
SELLER WAS AWARE ON JANUARY 31, 1957, THA:T' 8PE-
CIAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF THE OFFSET AL-
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LOWED BY THE OOUR,T WOULD OCCUR IF THE ORDER 
WAS NOT DELIVEREn BY APRIL 15, 1957, AND IT WAS 
ERROR THEREFORE TO ALLOW SUCH ~SIPECIAL DAM-
The contract in question did not expressly state that 
time was of the essence and the seller had no reason to 
believe that without strict performance with respect to 
time that the contract of sale would not accomplish its 
purpose. 
In such circumstances the modern rule is that time 
is not of the essence. 17 A C.J.S. 789, Contracts Sec. 504 
(1). In the case of I-XL Eastern Furniture Comparvy 
v. Holly Hill Lumber Co. (D.S.C., 1955), 134 F. Supp. 
343, the court declared: 
"Courts are reluctant to hold that time is of 
the essence in contracts for manufacture and sale 
of non-existent goods, particularly when the goods 
are made to special order and are of a kind not 
readily saleable in the general market." 
The Court properly instructed the jury that special 
damages could be alllowed only to the extent that the jury 
found from the evidence such damages was in the contem-
plation of the parties at the time of the contract by reason 
of a lmowledge of the special facts and circumstances 
from which such special damages would arise (R. 70, 71, 
Instruction No. 4). 
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In this ease the evidence showed only that the seller 
knew that the track shoes in question were being pur-
t•ha~t~d to fulfill an order the buyer had from his customer 
who had ~pecified a delivery by April15, 19'57. 'There is 
no evidence in the record that the seller knew the terms 
of the buyer's resale. It may be presumed they contem-
plated a 20% profit since their quotation was based 
on a discount of that an1ount "for resale." That amount 
would be $1,164.00 according to the price of $34.65 per 
hundred weight according to the price on which the jury 
assessed the offset (20% of $34.65 x .70 x 240) or $1,558 
if the price of $44.00 per hundred weight which appel-
lant contends would be applicable is used. Likewise, there 
is no intilnation at all in the evidence that the seller knew 
or had any reason to know that the buyer's customer 
would cancel the order if delivery was not to be made 
t>xaetly as specified. There was no evidence from which 
it could be inferred that delay to the delivery date in-
tended by the .AJ.nerican Brake Shoe Company would be 
so critical as to amount to a failure of consideration on 
the buyer's contract with that customer and it is in-
consistent for the buyer in such situation to insist on 
holding his seller and releasing his buyer after both pur-
chasers cancelled their orders. The actual loss to the 
~-imerican Brake Shoe Company of manufacturing a cus-
tom product for which it then had no sale no doubt ex-
eeeded by a considerable mnount the actual loss sustained 
by :Jir. Taylor. At least the loss to that company ought 
not to be increased at the price of Mr. Taylor's generosity 
in not holding his customer to his contract. The lesser 
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amount Mr. Taylor would realize on that sale after de-
ducting the losses that Palisade 'Contractors would have 
sustained in getting half of subject product up to 15 days 
later than specified and the other half between 15 and 45 
days beyond that time would normally be considerable 
less than the profit .American Brake Shoe had in this 
production and the latter would undoubtedly have pre-
ferred to adjust its price to that extent so as to lose much 
less than as occurred here. 
POINT VI 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT WOULD JUSTIFY 
THE JURY IN ALDOWING AN OFFSET IN EXCE,SS OF 
$1,694.40, AND rr WAS THEREFORE ERROR FOR THE 
COURT TO ALLOW A VERDICT OF $2,5'90.00 'TO STAND IN 
SPITE OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REDUCTION TO 
THE LE'SSER AMOUNT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VER-
DICT. 
As will be seen from the price quotation of American 
Brake Shoe Company (EXHIBIT 2), the price of the 
non-skid type shoe, the type applicable in this case 
(EXHIBIT'S 3 and 1), would be $44.00 per hundred 
weight rather than $34.65 per hundred weight for the 
other two types of different size and weights as set forth 
in that quotation. There is no evidence whatsoever that 
the price for the non-skid type was to be less than $44.00 
per hundred weight no matter what width or weight was 
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ot·dPrTd. Hence the jury's verdict in accepting the com-
putatiom; of respondent's counsel ($31.70 x 240 less 
$:1-Uir> x. .70 x ~+0 less 20% = $2,799.84) with some unex-
plained cOinpensating adjustn1ent finds no support in 
the (•vidence and Inust be adjusted in accordance with 
Uw proof. If any offset is allowed at all, it must be 
computed as follows: $31.70 x 240 less $44.00 x . 70 x 
~-1-0 less 20% of the last figure, which would amount to 
$l,ti94.50, the same figure except for lOc given in respon-
dPnt's motion to correct the judgment (R 77). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion 
for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the case and 
in not entering a judgment for plaintiff as prayed not-
withstanding the verdict in accordance with plaintiff's 
motion after the verdict was returned because any con-
tract entered into by the parties which involved the 
disputed offset was not breached by plaintiff's assignor 
with respect to the delivery date (Point II above), 
because the contract between them expressly excluded 
any liability for such special damages as involved here 
(Point I), because the contract of sale was rescinded 
by mutual consent after any liability under it arose 
(Point III), because no special damages were in the 
contemplation of the parties to the contract at that time 
(Point Y), because the buyer here made no attempt to 
mitigate or eliminate any special damages (Point IV) 
or for any of said reasons. 
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Even if an offset is allowed because none of the 
above points have merit, the maxinnun offset allowable 
under the evidence would be $1,694.40 (Point VI), and 
in that event the judgment should be for the sum of 
$1,790.62 plus interest on that sUln since December 11, 
1961. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSEN & SUM8ION 
65 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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